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Summary: The aim of this article is to illustrate various pitfalls which 
must be dealt with before an international agreement may begin to 
function, ie before it creates a legal obligation upon a contracting state. 
The Czech Republic is, according to the authors, an appropriate exam-
ple to illustrate this, for various reasons, as it is an EU Member State 
with a (prevailing) parliamentary form of governance and a (rather 
complex) bicameral parliament.
In the first place, the authors deal with the historical and comparative 
context of the ratification procedure of international agreements in the 
Czech Republic. Since this procedure in every country involves the 
interplay of several bodies, a proper evaluation of the historical con-
text may help in the interpretation of constitutional regulation, which 
is rather brief in the Czech Republic. One of the main questions of the 
ratification procedure, which the authors address, is the role of the 
president of the Czech Republic in the procedure of the ratification 
of international agreements. On the basis of the historical and the 
current constitutional regulation, the authors conclude that the compe-
tence of the president related to international agreements cannot be 
considered to be his/her prerogative. The president’s act of ratifica-
tion is, according to the authors, the formal conclusion of an internal 
consultation procedure on an international agreement in the Czech Re-
public. In exercising this competence, the president is endowed with a 
very limited margin of discretion.
The authors furthermore make a comparative study based on a questi-
onnaire circulated via the European Centre for Parliamentary Resear-
ch and Documentation on the role of the government, parliament and 
the head of state in the ratification procedure of international treaties.
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The main part of the article deals with selected problems and possi-
ble solutions of the negotiation procedure of international agreements 
and the practice of application (namely the provisional application of 
international treaties, the classification of international treaties, repe-
ated submissions of the proposal on the expression of consent with 
the ratification of an international treaty by chambers of parliament, 
simplified parliamentary approval for the ratification of presidential 
treaties, and the concept of ratification).
The article ends with brief observations regarding international trea-
ties concluded by the European Union or the Union together with the 




A significant concern of both international and European law doctri-
ne is quite naturally focused on the effects that ‘classical’ international 
agreements exert on the legal orders of signatory states or EU Member 
States. This would also include agreements concluded by the European 
Union, or among other contracting parties by the European Union. Our 
aim is to present various pitfalls which must be dealt with before an 
agreement may begin to function, ie before it creates a legal obligation 
upon the contracting state. The Czech Republic is an appropriate exam-
ple to illustrate this for various reasons, as it is an EU Member State with 
a (prevailing) parliamentary form of governance and a (more complex) bi-
cameral parliament. The relationship between international law and the 
Czech Republic’s constitution is deeply rooted in history, going back to 
1920 when the first definitive constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic 
was adopted. Even if the current Czech constitution was amended due 
to accession to the EU several years ago, it still remains incomplete. It 
presents various problems to resolve, which more than likely will be en-
countered in other states as well. 
At the same time, the Czech Republic may be considered somewhat 
atypical because the formal status of its head of state is slightly stronger 
than usually encountered in parliamentary republics. The well-establis-
hed tradition of high public respect for the office of the Czech president 
also plays an important role.1 A combination of these factors with a po-
litically strong head of state with pronounced opinions may result in the 
Czech Republic taking the spotlight, as occurred during the dramatic 
process of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. 
1 See J Kysela and Z Kühn ‘Presidential Elements in Government: The Czech Republic’ 
(2007) 1 European Constitutional Law Review 91.
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II. Insufficient constitutional foundation – problems in disputes 
between constitutional actors
As concerns international law, the Czechoslovak constitutions from 
1918 (the first provisional constitution) until the end of the existence of 
the Czechoslovak state were slightly elaborated over time, which reflected 
the constitution’s growing importance. This is also true of the current 
constitution, in force since 1 January 1993 and in which article 1 para-
graph 2 (the basis for the functioning of general international law) and 
article 10a (authorisation for the transfer of competences in particular 
to the EU) were added to the amended articles 10 and 49 (the status 
of international agreements in the legal order). Other provisions of the 
constitution were affected as well. Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, the 
central competence provision, ie the president’s power to conclude and 
ratify international agreements, has remained the same. The provision of 
the constitution reads: 
The president of the republic: a) represents the state externally, 
b) concludes and ratifies international agreements; the president 
may transfer the conclusion of international agreements to the go-
vernment or to its particular members with its consent. 
The constitutional charter from 1920, as opposed to the provisional 
constitution from 1918, extracted the contractual competence from the 
general state representation competence. Since that time, the text has 
not changed to a great extent. What did change in our view, however, was 
the context and, as a result, the meaning.
This is the classical problem of the adaptation of unchanged texts 
and institutions which is connected with the need for evolutional change 
in the ‘pre-understanding’ of the concerned actors and interpreters, ie, 
their understanding of an old text in changing contexts (the changing 
role of international law in the international community as well as in the 
Czech Republic, shifts in the competences of other constitutional bodies, 
etc). Besides, one person may understand the same provision or clause 
as forming part of the prerogatives of the head of state, while another 
person attributes to it the function of identifying the body which fina-
lises the process of the assumption of international obligations, but in 
reality the assumption has already been decided by someone else. In this 
instance, when disagreement occurs at the starting point of interpreta-
tion, a fragmentary and changeless constitutional regulation becomes a 
disadvantage.
Labelling it a ‘disadvantage’ may not be entirely correct, since it is 
connected with different types of emerging problems and ways they are 
resolved in constitutional law. We can, for instance, say that the reality of 
the assumption of international obligations differs significantly from the 
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text of the constitution, since it is dominated by the government and not 
by the President of the Republic. In the Czech Republic, this situation is 
also rather similar to the procedure for the nomination of judges, which 
rests formally in the hands of the president, yet is in fact dominated by 
the Ministry of Justice. Such divergence can occur as long as all bodies 
concerned adhere to the standing practice. If, however, someone starts 
reverting to the constitutional text, or possibly interprets the constituti-
on in an unexpected manner (‘It is I, therefore it is my will, that is to be 
projected in the conclusions, ratification, nomination...’), he breaks the 
consensus on which the practice has been built. The outcome can be: 
a) general acceptance of the new definition of the roles (reformulation of 
the Hartian rule of recognition); b) stalemate (dissonance leads to mutual 
blocking); c) legislative intervention; d) calling for a neutral arbiter – an 
authoritative interpreter.
In the last mentioned case, a change occurs in the model of gover-
nance in the defined group of relations, from the dyadic model, charac-
terised by two parties arguing (as in a tug-of-war) between themselves, 
into a triadic model with the arbiter standing above the parties.2 In our 
situation, this practically means judicialisation, here most probably on 
the basis of a conflict of competences. If judicial proceedings are not bro-
ught about, or if such a procedural tool is not available, a new practice, 
or a differently interpreted one, may arise - in short, a constitutional 
convention that will have to be taken into account in the interpretation 
of constitutional relations and institutes. Each of the actors must take 
into account that not only his action, but also his inaction, ‘can be used 
against him’.3 
2 M Shapiro and A Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics and Judicialization (OUP 2002) 15.
3 A Heard distinguishes the absence of a precedent and a negative precedent. In the for-
mer case, the occasion to act did not occur (eg to decide on a state of emergency) so we can 
hardly draw any relative conclusions. In the latter case, action in a specific manner was 
not taken, and as such an action was felt to be inconsistent with a constitutional principle. 
See A Heard, Canadian Constitutional Conventions: The Marriage of Law and Politics (OUP 
1991). In relation to our topic, this means that we will not find in practice how it is with the 
exercise of the power to ratify international treaties as long as the president ratifies them, 
because he intends to do so. Only after he refuses to ratify will we deal with the relevance 
and consequences of his (un)willingness. An important factor is the reaction of others who 
may become reconciled with the possible refusal (postponement) of the ratification, or may 
take political and legal actions expressing their disagreement. Should others abstain from 
anything and the president finally ‘successfully’ not ratify, in the long term or repeatedly, 
we can hardly ignore this fact when interpreting the constitution. In this sense, Z Koudelka 
points out the long-lasting non-ratification of the additional protocol to the European Social 
Charter – does the inaction of the government mean assenting to the opinion that the presi-
dent is entitled to postpone or refuse ratification? See Z Koudelka, ‘Prezident a mezinárodní 
smlouvy’ [President and International Treaties] (2009) 9 Právník 937-938.
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III. General remarks on the division of roles in the conclusion of in-
ternational treaties
The traditional starting point for the division of roles in the process 
of concluding international treaties is the well-known thesis according 
to which foreign policy is ‘the province of Princes, not of commoners’.4 
Historically, it concerns the prerogative of heads of state, the real admi-
nistration of which is usually in the hands of the government (we refer to 
the parliamentary form of governance). In the course of time, those who 
started to intervene in the origination of international obligations alongsi-
de executive power were parliaments. 
One of the preconditions was the distinction between the subject 
possessing the treaty-making capacity (the sovereign, but also the esta-
tes in the Estate’s monarchy), and the body endowed with treaty-making 
power (the monarch or his assignee as the representative of a contracting 
party).5 This distinction, coupled with control of whether ‘a plenipoten-
tiary who had negotiated and signed a treaty in fact acted within the 
scope of his full powers’,6 moved from the end of the 18th century to a 
level where ‘the requirement of ratification gives the legislature a degree 
of control over the exercise of treaty-making power by the executive’.7 
Concise clauses in the first constitutions, often inspiring one another, 
were consecutively modified by varied developments and by the practice 
of state bodies.
An important aspect for the inclusion of parliaments in concluding 
international treaties also arises from the subsequent status of inter-
national treaties in the domestic legal order. Therefore, for example in 
countries with a dualistic approach, the weak position of parliament in 
the ratification procedure can be compensated for by its impact on the 
internal implementation of the international treaties in the form of laws. 
In any event, this represents a combination of the controlling (and legiti-
mising) role and the law-making role. 
Traditionally, several categories of international treaties commonly 
requiring the consent of parliament have been developed: treaties intro-
ducing a financial burden on the budget or those that change the state 
4 B Ehrenzeller, Legislative Gewalt und Aussenpolitik (Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1993) V.
5 For details on the historical development of specific theories, see P Haggenmacher ‘Eu-
ropean Origins of Legislative Participation’ in SA Riesenfeld and FM Abbott (eds), Parliamen-
tary Participation in the Making and Operation of Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1994) 
19ff.
6 Council of Europe, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Treaty Ma-
king: Expression of Consent by States to be Bound by a Treaty (Kluwer Law International 
2001) 11.
7 ibid.
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borders,8 treaties about war and peace, etc.9 Furthermore, in some sta-
tes a general requirement exists for parliaments to give their consent to 
any international treaties, while only certain exceptions are recognised.10 
Today, above all, the involvement of parliaments raises the question of 
a search for balance between the efforts of the executive branch to carry 
out effective and efficient foreign policies and the requirement for parlia-
mentary supervision of these policies (the form of governance can be a 
significant variable). 
From a chronological perspective, the particular ways of parliament 
involvement can be divided into three phases: the initiating and negotia-
ting phase, the phase concerning approval or ratification of the treaty, 
and the phase after the treaty has entered into force.11
During the initiatory and negotiation phase, a settled practice of in-
formal consultation of parliament by the executive may exist, despite the 
fact that explicit regulation is lacking. Moreover, a broader consultation of 
the persons concerned takes place in a situation where the conclusion of 
a particular treaty could influence the outcome of upcoming elections.12 
The advantage of this approach is that the treaty’s proposed wording will 
reflect the comments of members of parliament that could otherwise hin-
der its approval, should these comments be made after the text has been 
finalised. The extensive involvement of the people’s representatives in the 
conclusion of treaties having important nationwide significance can, at the 
same time, increase their legitimacy.13 On the other hand, we must realise 
that individual members of parliament usually do not possess the experti-
se needed for the formulation of the treaties’ wording and it might be more 
effective for them to merely comment on the prospective treaty’s provisions.
In the phase of the conclusion of an international treaty, the extent 
of the involvement of parliaments differs from one state to another: star-
ting with the concept of the tacit consent of parliament if certain conditi-
ons are met,14 through the option of the parliament only to give consent 
to a treaty or to refuse it, to the powers of parliament to set conditions 
8 Compare, eg, the provisions of the Sardinian and then Italian Constitution of 1848. See 
G Bognetti ‘The Role of the Italian Parliament in the Treaty-Making Process’ in Riesenfeld 
and Abbott (n 5) 90.
9 Council of Europe (n 6) 63.
10 P Van Dijk and BG Tahzib ‘Parliamentary Participation in the Treaty-Making Process in 
the Netherlands’ in Riesenfeld and Abbott (n 5) 115.
11 For more details, see Riesenfeld and Abbott (n 5) 7ff.
12 Lord Templeman ‘Treaty-Making and the British Parliament’ in Riesenfeld and Abbott (n 
5) 163.
13 Another known, but, except for some changes in the European law, rarely used tool is 
the ratification referendum. See HC Scheu, Úvod do mezinárodního práva veřejného [Intro-
duction to the Public International Law] (Auditorium 2010) 39.
14 Riesenfeld and Abbott (n 5) 119.
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requiring a reservation, declaration, or an interpretative explanation to 
be attached to the treaty. Separate issues consist in whether the authori-
sed body is duty bound to ratify the treaty to which parliamentary assent 
was granted.
In addition, even after giving assent to an international treaty, parlia-
ment can have a direct or indirect impact on its application. Primarily, the-
re is a link to the relationship between international and domestic laws and 
the status of international treaties in the domestic legal order, ie whether 
parliament can limit or eliminate the application of the international treaty 
by subsequent legal regulations. Furthermore, in some partially monistic 
systems, parliament influences the subsequent effects of the treaty in the 
domestic legal order by the chosen procedure for approval.15 Indirect inter-
ferences are also conceivable via the distribution of budgetary resources. 
There is, however, a far-reaching issue: whether the assent of parliament is 
also needed for the termination of the application of an international treaty 
requiring parliamentary approval for its entry into force.
IV. A brief comparison of the legal regulations of the competences of 
participants in the ratification process 
Current international law is a dynamic system that has expanded 
into many areas of regulation since the mid 20th century.16 For this re-
ason, we consider it useful to explore different models of involvement of 
state bodies in the process of ratifying international treaties, ie the most 
important source of international law. The aim is to describe the diffe-
rences between foreign regulations, especially in comparison with Czech 
practice. Priority is given to democratic states with a civil law tradition.17
We proceed from our research executed in the form of a questionna-
ire addressed to ECPRD18 correspondents. The results were checked aga-
15 See, for example, art 86 lit d) of the Slovak constitution, according to which it belongs to 
the competences of parliament to decide whether a particular international treaty will have 
primacy in application according to art 7 para 5 of the constitution of the Slovak Republic. 
Before the so-called ‘Euro-amendment’ of the Czech constitution in 2001, effective qualifi-
cation of the subsequent status of the treaty within the national legal order (only treaties on 
fundamental rights could have direct effect and be applicable over conflicting national law) 
was also under the competence of parliament, more precisely the Chamber of Deputies. The 
government used to submit proposals for granting assent to ratification first there and then 
to the Senate.
16 M Shaw, International Law (6th edn, OUP 2008) 44.
17 Rich literature exists on the situation in the United States, but the transferability of the 
conclusions to states with a continental legal tradition has certain limits.
18 ECPRD is the abbreviation for ‘European Centre for Parliamentary Research and Docu-
mentation’. The Centre was created in 1977 as an inter-parliamentary network for the 
exchange of information. It consists of 47 states and several international parliamentary 
assemblies, and another 4 states have observer status.
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inst previous research carried out within the Committee of Legal Advisers 
on Public International Law (CAHDI) and the British Institute of Interna-
tional and Comparative Law,19 or against some other sources.
The first issue concerns the role of individual government bodies 
(government, parliament, and the head of state) in the ratification proce-
dures of international treaties. The division of powers in the modern state 
generally implies a scheme of the basic division of functions in expre-
ssing the state’s consent to be bound by an international treaty: the go-
vernment concludes the treaty, parliament gives its assent, and the head 
of state ratifies it. In practice, however, we see different models of these 
procedures that depend on constitutional, legal and political circumstan-
ces, as well as on the historical experience of a particular state.20
IV.1 Conclusion of international treaties
A basic distinction can be found in the contrasting involvement of the 
head of state and the government in the process of expressing the appro-
val of the state to be bound by an international treaty. On the one hand, 
there are countries of the so-called Westminster tradition, where the final 
decision on the international obligations of the state belongs to the head of 
state (a monarch) practically without any formal (legal) limitation from par-
liament (eg the United Kingdom or Canada).21 Here, the power to conclude 
international treaties is considered to be the prerogative of the monarch, 
but the requirement of countersigning the decision of the head of state by 
a member of the executive branch answerable to the parliamentary assem-
bly significantly limits the traditional concept of the prerogative.22 The re-
verse of this model can be found in states where the power to bind the state 
is given exclusively to the government (eg Sweden or Japan), and thus the 
head of state does not interfere in the process of concluding international 
treaties.23 However, these contradictions are merely illusory, because in 
both these cases of monarchies the will of the government is realised, and 
in fact the difference consists of whose headed notepaper is used – that of 
the government or also that of the head of state.
From the point of view of their frequency, both ‘extreme’ cases are 
exceptional; in most states there exist certain divisions of power between 
the head of state and the government in the process of the formation of 
19 Council of Europe (n 6) VIII.
20 Ibid
21 Responses from A Thorpe, the United Kingdom’s ECPRD correspondent (20 January 
2010) and V Hooper, the Canadian ECPRD correspondent (14 December 2009). Even in 
those cases, the head of state may empower another subject, usually a member of the go-
vernment, to affix a signature.
22 See also Council of Europe (n 6) 25.
23 ibid 26-27.
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obligations. It must therefore be distinguished whether the head of state 
formally has full powers to oblige the state externally (a typical example 
is the United States of America, but also the Czech Republic), or whether 
a division of powers to ratify international treaties exists between the 
head of state on the one hand (usually international treaties approved by 
parliament), and the government on the other hand. The latter model is 
described as the most frequent by the authors of the Council of Europe 
study, and can be found, for example, in Germany, Austria or Italy.24
An entirely separate issue concerning the power to conclude treaties 
arises in federal states, which is mostly related to the division of competen-
ces between the units and the federation. The units of federation ordinarily 
do not possess their own international legal personality. Thus, generally, 
their participation in the making of international obligations takes the form 
of approval of the treaty’s text by the legislative assembly of the unit before 
the actual conclusion of the treaty, in the name of the union (thus, it deals 
with the power to veto the conclusion of an international treaty that is rela-
ted to the competence of the units of the union). They can possibly also be 
involved in the process of negotiation through their own acting delegates.25 
The interests of the units of federation in the intra-national approval of 
an international treaty can also be protected by the requirement that the 
international treaty that touches on issues belonging to the competences 
of the units must also be given approval by the chamber of the parliament 
in which the units of the federation are represented.26 
The role of the government, as indicated above, does not substan-
tially differ in models used across various states. In all the countries 
examined, the government takes part in the initial phases of the conclu-
sion of an international treaty. The reason is that current international 
politics cannot be separated from domestic politics, which are normally 
carried out by the government, and the government is also politically res-
ponsible for them. In addition, from the practical perspective of ensuring 
expertise in the process of negotiating international treaties, it is clear 
that the main role will be given to the civil service operating in central 
administrative bodies.
From the comparative point of view, the position of ministries of fo-
reign affairs is particularly interesting. In comparison with their Czech 
counterpart, which, in the process of concluding international treaties, 
24 ibid 20. Interestingly, the authors from the European Council classified the Czech Repu-
blic as a country belonging to this category. With regard to art 63 para 1 lit b) of the Czech 
constitution, it is, however, inaccurate: according to the constitution, the power to conclude 
international treaties is vested in the president, who can nevertheless transfer this power to 
the government or its individual members.
25 Council of Europe (n 6) 20, 35ff.
26 As is the situation, for example, in Germany and Austria – see hereinafter for details.
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to a large extent has a co-ordinating and methodical role, the ministries 
of foreign affairs of some other states (Georgia,27 Macedonia28) are fully 
responsible for the formal requirements of the treaty before its signing. 
These latter states also take responsibility for the submission of a ratifi-
cation bill (or some other method of approval of the international treaty) 
to parliament. A traditionally strong position is also held by the ministry 
of foreign affairs in the states of the Westminster model.29
IV.2 Approval of international treaties 
The government may likewise act as a body expressing consent with 
an international treaty on behalf of the state. This power may arise di-
rectly from the constitution or it can be delegated by the head of state. 
Constitution-based power to express consent to an international treaty 
is characteristic, for example, of the Federal Republic of Germany, whe-
re the juridical institute of so-called administrative agreements30 exists. 
They concern treaties not affecting the political issues of the Federation 
(Bund) and especially that do not require a federal law for their imple-
mentation.31 On the other hand, it is important to stress that, in additi-
on, these treaties are internationally binding on the Federal Republic of 
Germany as a whole, not only its public authorities.32 The main difference 
between ‘governmental’ and ‘ministerial’ treaties in the Czech Republic 
rests on separate constitutional power to conclude such international 
treaties by the public administration. This can have practical relevance 
when the head of state decides to reassume power to conclude a parti-
cular treaty, even of a governmental nature. It is obvious that such an 
approach would be inconceivable in a model based on the constitutional 
classification of international treaties.
In France, we can also find administrative agreements (arrangements 
administratifs), although these are not treaties under public international 
law, but arrangements among ministries dealing with technical or admi-
nistrative issues falling exclusively under their competence.33
27 Response of J Lazarevska, the Georgian ECPRD correspondent (25 December 2009).
28 Response of N Getia, the Macedonian ECPRD correspondent (21 December 2009).
29 Council of Europe (n 6) 34
30 Art 59 para 2 last sentence of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
31 B Kempen ‘Commentary on Art. 59 of the Basic Law’ in H von Mangoldt, F Klein, Ch 
Starck (eds), Das Bonner Grundgesetz. Kommentar (4th edn, vol 2, Verlag Franz Vahlen 
2000) 1875.
32 ibid.
33 These technical arrangements are made in order to specify the existing international tre-
aties or for the purpose of the limited cooperation of the administrative bodies – see Council 
of Europe (n 6) 22. In Czech law, the category of administrative or technical agreements 
that would be binding and at the same time would not be approved as international treaties 
does not exist. In international forums, many documents are labelled as such in order to 
facilitate the process of their approval.
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The role of parliament in the comparative perspective is basically 
similar, which follows from the fact that these states belong to parliamen-
tary democracies, where a division of powers exists, among other things, 
between law-making and the executive branches. The involvement of par-
liament is therefore important, not only regarding the expression of law-
making competence in a state which is being weakened by international 
treaties concluded by the executive that has priority over the laws, but 
also concerning the expression of the supervisory function of parliament 
vis-à-vis the executive power.34
In most cases, the form of approval of international treaties in other 
states differs from the methods of approval in the Czech Republic. In-
ternational treaties are predominantly approved by a ratification law, to 
which, in principle, rules related to the adoption of laws apply. An arran-
gement similar to the one in the Czech Republic, where parliament expre-
sses approval of an international treaty in the form of a resolution, can 
also be found in Slovakia.35
This fact also has a substantial influence on the consequences of a 
lack of approval for the domestic ratification of an international treaty 
by one of the chambers of parliament in bicameral systems. In these 
circumstances, the ECPRD correspondents were asked whether, in the 
case where one chamber rejects an international treaty and in the event 
of a re-vote, it is necessary for the chamber that has already approved the 
treaty to vote again to approve it.
The general implications of the responses were that, if the approval 
of an international treaty in parliament resembles the classical legislative 
procedure (ie the approval of parliament is usually given in the form of 
a ratification law) one of the chambers normally has a stronger position 
and can outvote (regularly by a stricter majority) the other chamber, si-
milar to the case of ordinary laws.36 If outvoting does not occur after the 
refusal of the treaty, the ratification process may not proceed. Should the 
ratification process be reopened, a new proposal must be submitted for 
consideration in both parliamentary chambers.
An exception to this process was observed by the Belgian corres-
pondent, according to whom in Belgium it is possible in the case of a re-
34 P Mlsna and J Kněžínek, Mezinárodní smlouvy v českém právu [International Treaties in 
the Czech Law] (Linde 2009) 222. 
35 See art 84 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic.
36 In Romania, the Senate is this ‘stronger’ chamber that can outvote the refused proposal 
for approval of an international treaty in the Chamber of Deputies (response of P Turcu, the 
Romanian ECPRD correspondent (22 January 2010)), while for example in Austria or Slove-
nia it is the lower chamber of parliament (responses of I Siess-Scherz, the Austrian ECPRD 
correspondent (15 December 2009) and J Pajnikhar, the Slovenian ECPRD correspondent 
(15 December 2009)).
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fusal of the proposal by the Senate to resubmit it only to this chamber.37 
The approval of international treaties in only one chamber is exceptional: 
an example is Austria.38 The exception to the exclusive competence of 
the National Assembly concerns international treaties governing issues 
falling exclusively under the competence of the Länder (art 50 para 2 
of the Federal constitution) or that change the conventional grounds of 
the European Union (art 50 para 4 of the Federal constitution). These 
international treaties must also be approved by the Federal Council (the 
second chamber of parliament).
A more complicated situation exists in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, where the procedure following refusal in one of the chambers of 
parliament depends upon the approval procedure of the particular treaty 
(according to the content subsumed under the competences catalogue of 
either the Federation or Länder). In most cases, the first chamber (Bun-
destag) can outvote the second chamber (Bundesrat). However, for excep-
tional issues where domestic legislation must be approved by both cham-
bers, an international treaty with similar content must also be approved 
by both chambers.39 
IV.3 Role of the head of state in the process of the ratification of 
international treaties
The last question posed in relation to the role of the head of state 
in the process of the ratification of international treaties ran: ‘If an inter-
national treaty is successfully approved by parliament, is it still legally 
possible for the head of state to refuse to ratify it, and for this decision to 
have the character of an absolute veto?’
The responses to this question differed significantly and this clearly 
depended not solely on the models of the ratification procedures for in-
ternational treaties in an individual state, but also on doctrinal opinions.
The states in the Westminster tradition stated identically that, with 
regard to the concept of ratification as a prerogative, the head of state 
may refuse to ratify an international treaty. Moreover, parliaments do not 
37 Response of M van der Hulst, the Belgian ECPRD correspondent (9  December 2009). 
However, the reading of an international treaty in the Belgian parliament commences in the 
Senate, so resubmission to the Senate is natural. 
38 Response of I Siess-Scherz, the Austrian ECPRD correspondent (15  December 2009).
39 Response of K Bartsch, the German ECPRD correspondent (25 January 2010). We are, 
of course, aware that it might be an overstatement to denote the Bundesrat as a parliamen-
tary chamber. Before the recent reform of German federalism, the ratio of laws requiring 
the approval of the Bundesrat in federal law-making was predominant – it followed from the 
expansion of the Federation (Bund) into the competences of the Länder. Now this is retur-
ning more to the position foreseen by the founding fathers of the German Basic Law who 
made provisions for extensive decentralisation. 
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approve the ratification of a treaty, but currently they only consider the 
treaty.40
In parliamentary forms of governance where international treaties 
are ratified by the head of state, the predominant opinion was that the 
head of state is required to ratify the international treaty to which parlia-
ment has given consent. Nevertheless, it is useful to structure the issue 
in more detail.
As stated above, in most states, parliaments indicate approval with 
ratification in the form of laws on ratification that have a process of appro-
val very similar to the approval process for ordinary laws. As a result, the 
head of state has the power of veto which is not, however, of an absolute 
nature, but is only suspensive, which parliament can outvote.
A suspensive veto exists, for example, in Italy; after the entry into 
force of the law on ratification, the most widespread opinion holds that 
the president can no longer refuse the ratification of an international 
treaty.41 A similar situation exists in Macedonia42 and Lithuania.43 In Ro-
mania, the president may use a suspensive veto against a ratification act, 
otherwise he will promulgate a law on ratification within 20 days. Accor-
ding to an explicit constitutional regulation in article 91 of the constitu-
tion of Romania, the president must also submit the concluded treaty to 
parliament within a ‘reasonable time limit’.44 Similarly, the president in 
Bulgaria also possesses a suspensive power of veto and if this is outvoted 
he must ratify the treaty within 7 days.45 In Cyprus, there exists a sus-
pensive veto of the president and vice-president (as collectively exercised 
power).46
An interesting regulation exists in Iceland where, if the president 
refuses a proposed law on ratification, it is not subject to a new appro-
40 Responses of V Hooper, the Canadian ECPRD correspondent (14 December 2009) and 
A Thorpe, Great Britain’s ECPRD correspondent (20 January 2010). But we are aware that 
exercise of the prerogative is in fact vested in the government; therefore, here the issue 
deals more with the possibility of the government to withdraw the intent to ratify the treaty 
concluded than with the discretion of the Crown.
41 Response of V Striati, the Italian ECPRD correspondent (14 January 2010). But the 
situation described never happened according to the correspondent and is therefore only a 
concern of doctrinal legal literature.
42 Response of J Lazarevska, the Macedonian ECPRD correspondent (25 December 2009).
43 Response of E Sinkevicius, the Lithuanian ECPRD correspondent (22 December 2009). 
The president submits, according to art 84 of the constitution of the Lithuanian Republic, 
a proposal for the law on ratification to the parliament, which per se indicates his or her 
positive attitude to the ratification of the international treaty. 
44 Response of P Turcu, the Romanian ECPRD correspondent (22 January 2010). The text 
of the Romanian constitution is available in English on the Romanian parliament’s website 
<http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/ site.page?id=371> accessed 24 October 2011. 
45 Response of E Kamenova, the Bulgarian ECPRD correspondent (11  January 2010).
46 Response of S Socratous, the Cypriot ECPRD correspondent (9 February 2010).
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val of parliament, but is automatically submitted to a referendum.47 In 
Estonia, should the ratification act be refused and if parliament outvotes 
the president’s veto, the head of state may ask the constitutional court to 
decide on the issue of ratification.48 The Belgian ECPRD correspondent 
admitted the possibility of a refusal of the ratification of an international 
treaty by the head of state; nevertheless, with regard to the parliamentary 
form of governance and the political accountability of the government, it 
is viable only with the tacit approval of parliament (notably if circumstan-
ces change after the approval by parliament of the international treaty).49
In Germany, the president may veto a law on ratification if the treaty 
itself or the domestic regulation connected to it is prima facie contrary to 
the constitution or to international law. However, according to doctrinal 
opinion, the president cannot refuse a ratification act solely for political 
reasons. The president’s refusal of the ratification act can be reviewed 
by the Constitutional Court. Contemporary German doctrine tends to 
understand that if a law on ratification enters into force, the president is 
required to ratify the international treaty. Nonetheless, this issue has not 
appeared before the Constitutional Court as of yet.50
In Poland the traditionally strong position of the president exists 
in the area of foreign relations. According to the prevailing opinion of 
doctrine, the president has, according to article 133 paragraph 1 of the 
constitution of the Polish Republic, exclusive power to ratify an internati-
onal treaty, from which the right to refuse ratification also follows.51 The 
Austrian correspondent expressed a similar outcome: the president has 
the right, not the duty, to ratify an international treaty.52
The situation of Switzerland is specific inasmuch as the government 
also fulfils the function of head of state. The approval of ratification by a 
parliamentary chamber at the same time authorises the government to 
ratify the treaty. However, the government is not obliged to do so if inter-
national circumstances change. In practice, it would be unusual for the 
government to withdraw the intent to ratify the treaty once it submitted 
it to parliament.53
47 Response of V Gislason, the Icelandic ECPRD correspondent (19 January 2010).
48 Response of R Kangur, the Estonian ECPRD correspondent (13 January 2010).
49 Response of M van der Hulst, the Belgian ECPRD correspondent (9 December 2009).
50 Response of K Bartsch, the German ECPRD correspondent (25 January 2010). In fact, it 
is only at the government’s discretion to have the treaty ratified, irrespective of the fact that 
the treaty had been previously approved by parliament – see Ehrenzeller (n 4) 200.
51 Response of W Staśkiewicz, the Polish ECPRD correspondent (8 January 2010). The 
correspondent makes reference to the commentary of M Masternak-Kubiak, Umowa międ-
zinarodowa w prawie konstytucyjnym, [International Treaty in the Constitutional Law] 
(Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN 1997) 77.
52 Response of I Siess-Scherz, the Austrian ECPRD correspondent (15 December 2009).
53 Ehrenzeller (n 4) 458 and 476.
239CYELP 7 [2011] 225-259
V. Regulation of the internal approval of international treaties in the 
Czech Republic
The fundamental issues of the conclusion and validity of internatio-
nal treaties are primarily regulated by the norms of public international 
law. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 should be 
mentioned initially (and the similar Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties between States and International Organizations or Between In-
ternational Organizations of 1986, which has not yet entered into force) 
and also some rules of customary international law.54 For the aims of 
this study, we focus mainly on the internal aspects of the conclusion and 
approval of international treaties.
The constitution of the Czech Republic, as the fundamental fra-
mework of internal law-making procedures, mentions international tre-
aties in only a few provisions related in part to competences, and in part 
to procedures and effects. This is coupled with the fact that the statutory 
regulation of the process of the conclusion of international treaties and 
its internal approval is limited to some phases. These phases consist, in 
particular, of the laying down of the coordination competence of the Mi-
nistry of Foreign Affairs,55 the process of the approval of an international 
treaty in parliament,56 and finally the relation to the optional review of 
constitutionality by the Constitutional Court.57 An important regulation 
on the publication of international treaties is also contained in a separate 
act.58
54 For more detail, see, eg, Shaw (n 16) 902ff. The Vienna Convention regulates mainly 
formal and technical questions connected with the formation of international treaties and 
the binding effect of their provisions, while it deals with the national consultation only 
marginally – the exception being, eg, its art 46 para 1, according to which ‘[a] State may 
not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation 
of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating 
its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of 
fundamental importance’. In the Czech Republic, the Vienna Convention of 1969 is part of 
the legal order published in the official collection of laws as No 15/1998 Coll. 
55 § 6 sec. 3 lit. f), g) and h) Act No 2/1969 Coll, on the establishment of the ministries and 
other central bodies of the public administration in the Czech Republic, as amended.
56 Especially § 108–109 Act No 90/1995 Coll, on the rules of procedure of the Chamber 
of Deputies, as amended (hereinafter also only RPCD), and § 115 and following Act No 
107/1999 Coll, on the rules of procedure of the Senate, as amended (hereinafter also only 
RPS).
57 Proceedings on the conformity of international treaties under art 10a and art 49 of the 
constitution with constitutional laws: § 71a–71e Act No 182/1993 Coll, on the Constitutio-
nal Court, as amended.
58 Act No 309/1999 Coll, on the Collection of laws and the Collection of international 
treaties, as amended. Technical issues are elaborated in the Methodical Instructions of 
the minister of foreign affairs related to the publication of international treaties (hereinaf-
ter: Methodical Instruction), available in: Metodická příručka ke sjednávání mezinárodních 
smluv [Guidelines for the Conclusion of International Treaties] (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Czech Republic 2004) 82-85.
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The focus of regulation rests on internal codes dominated by the 
Directive of the Government on the negotiation, national consultation, 
application and termination of the international treaties59 (hereinafter re-
ferred to as ‘Directive’). This internal regulation is usually followed by the 
internal regulations of other bodies involved in the negotiation of interna-
tional treaties, mainly that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Internal regulations of the government are, however, preceded by the 
Decision of the President of the Czech Republic No 144/1993 Coll on the 
negotiation of international treaties on the basis of which presidential, 
governmental and ministerial treaties are distinguished according to the 
body assuming the international obligation on behalf of the Czech Re-
public. From this decision alone, it is evident that such a body includes 
not only the president of the Czech Republic, as could be inferred from 
the wording of the constitution (see above), but in certain cases also the 
government or individual ministers.
The decision on the assumption of the obligation, or the confirma-
tion of the assumption of the obligation as the case may be, should ne-
vertheless respect the fact that international treaties do not arise spon-
taneously, but rather in a deliberate process fulfilling a certain objective. 
This is generally the cooperation of the Czech Republic with other states 
or international organisations (possibly with other subjects of internati-
onal law as well).60 Cooperation is realised between the state bodies in 
charge, and at the same time the application is not separable from dome-
stic procedures where the main responsibility belongs to the government. 
Since the respective ministries have at their disposal an expert staff for 
the preparation and negotiation of international treaties, in the current 
situation it is only theoretically apparent that the president of the Czech 
Republic would himself carry out his constitutional power to conclude 
international treaties, ie that he would not delegate it to the government.
Before the commencement of negotiations on an international tre-
aty, it is necessary to examine the goals of the newly proposed regulation 
and to specify the mandate for negotiations, especially the limits and 
priorities in the framework of which the negotiations on the wording of 
the treaty will take place. The Directive for expert negotiations serves this 
aim. Already before its preparation, the gestor, as the competent mini-
stry, must decide on the important issue of the qualification of the futu-
re international treaty under national law that influences, among other 
things, the national consultation procedure with regard to the Directive. 
A ministerial treaty is sent only to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for it 
59 Approved by the decision of the government of 11 February 2004 No 131. 
60 On the theory of the international law of international treaties, see JL Goldsmith and EA 
Posner, The Limits of International Law (OUP 2005) 83ff; A Cassese, International Law (OUP 
2001) 126ff.
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to express its opinion; a governmental treaty is sent also to all ministri-
es and the central public administration authorities concerned and, for 
information, also to the president. Finally, a presidential treaty is sent 
to all members of the government, to the central public administration 
authorities concerned, and to the president in order to obtain their opini-
ons, and to the chambers of parliament for their information. Only when 
there are no substantial objections from the competent bodies may it be 
adopted by the minister in charge, and at that point negotiations on the 
text of the treaty may begin.
Once negotiations on the text have successfully concluded, the phase 
before the signature of the treaty starts when another round of comments 
by the above-mentioned bodies takes place. In addition, in this phase the 
proposal for the conclusion of the treaty is sent to the chambers of parlia-
ment only for information.61 The proposal for the conclusion of the treaty 
containing the final text of the international treaty, as well as plenty of 
further appurtenances, is to be approved by the government (with the 
exception of ministerial treaties where the treaty is approved by the com-
petent minister on the basis of the previous consent of the minister of 
foreign affairs). In the case of presidential treaties, the decision of the go-
vernment expressing consent to the conclusion of an international treaty 
also contains a recommendation to the president of the Czech Republic to 
authorise the competent person to sign the treaty subject to ratification.62 
Afterwards, the Prime Minister is authorised by the above-mentioned go-
vernmental decision to submit the signed international treaty to both 
chambers of parliament to approve ratification of the international treaty.
The gestor of the treaty requests the Office of the President of the 
Czech Republic (via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to arrange full powers 
for a concrete person to sign the treaty (in the case of the signature of 
a governmental treaty, full powers are signed by the minister of foreign 
affairs on the basis of governmental authorisation). After the signature 
of the treaty, the next phase begins – internal approval of the text of the 
treaty that leads to ratification by the president of the Czech Republic. 
61 Despite this rule contained in the Directive, one cannot assume that potential relevantly 
expressed dissent of one of the chambers of parliament will not have any influence on the 
subsequent process. On the one hand, the Government also remains politically responsible 
to the Chamber of Deputies on issues of the conclusion of international treaties; on the 
other hand, the approval of both chambers is needed after the negotiation of a presidential 
treaty. The process of formal notice on the negotiation of international treaties listed in art 
49 of the Czech constitution (ie presidential treaties) is not much reflected in parliament in 
the authors’ knowledge.
62 The Directive does not restrict the number of persons that can be authorised for signatu-
re. Because of possible changes in governmental posts, there is the habit for authorisation 
not to be connected to a name, but to a function – eg the authorised person is the minister 
of the interior, not Mr XY, minister of the interior. However this rule does not apply to am-
bassadors or other possible plenipotentiaries.
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On the basis of the above-mentioned governmental decision, the Pri-
me Minister sends the treaty (specifically a sufficient number of copies 
thereof) simultaneously to both chambers of parliament.63 The procedure 
for parliamentary approval of the treaty is governed in detail by the rules 
of procedure of both chambers; the rule is that, after consultations in the 
competent committees of parliament, the treaty is approved in a plenary 
session.
After the signature of the treaty and during the national ratifica-
tion procedure, or possibly as a part thereof, there may be an optional 
phase consisting of a review of the conformity of the international treaty 
with the national constitutional legal order. The procedure in the Act on 
the Constitutional Court that was, to begin with, far from clear or, more 
precisely, had a substantially wide-open content, was developed further, 
mainly by practice in connection with its two decisions on the review of 
the Lisbon Treaty amending the Treaty on the European Union and the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community.64
Once both chambers of parliament have given their approval for the 
ratification of the international treaty, and if the procedure for the review 
of the constitutionality of the international treaty has not been initiated, 
or if such a review has ended with a decision of the Constitutional Court 
that the international treaty is not contrary to the constitutional order, 
it is possible to proceed to the stage of ratification by the president. The 
ratification instruments must be exchanged in a manner specified in the 
treaty. If the treaty is nationally negotiated as a presidential treaty, but 
does not require an exchange of ratification instruments, the Czech ratifi-
cation instrument is deposited with the archive of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. When all requirements are fulfilled, the treaty enters into force 
and is published in the Collection of international treaties. 
VI. Selected problems and their possible solutions 
Heretofore we have delineated the rules and explained how the na-
tional consultation procedure related to international treaties proceeds. 
63 Interestingly, the Czech constitution does not state which authority is to submit an in-
ternational treaty to parliament. From the comparative perspective, it follows that models 
exist where the treaty is submitted by the head of state – see part III above.
64 Similarly, J Wintr ‘První rozhodnutí Ústavního soudu o ústavnosti mezinárodní 
smlouvy’[The First Decision of the Constitutional Court on the Constitutionality of the In-
ternational Treaty] (2009) 1 Jurisprudence 21-31; Mlsna and Kněžínek (n 34) 481-539; and 
the articles by J Kysela, V Güttler and J Filip in A Gerloch and J Wintr (eds), Lisabonská 
smlouva a ústavní pořádek ČR [The Lisbon Treaty and the Constitutional Order of the Czech 
Republic] (Aleš Čeněk 2009). The Lisbon Treaty, although different in many aspects from 
classical international treaties, has so far been the only international treaty reviewed by the 
Constitutional Court in the Czech Republic. 
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The application of these rules nevertheless causes problems we would 
like to tackle.
VI.1 Provisional application of international treaties
The provisional application of international treaties presents a phe-
nomenon that is not unknown in practice,65 but is still somehow con-
troversial, since it is based on the application of an international treaty 
that is not yet in force or binding either on all or on a particular state. 
This means either that the treaty was signed but the process of national 
approval has not been carried out, so that the perfect expression of the 
will of the state to be bound by the treaty is lacking, or that the treaty 
has not entered into force at the international level (eg because of an in-
sufficient number of ratifications). We should be aware of the difference 
between the two situations if we reflect on the provisional application 
mainly from the internal, national perspective; in contrast, from the point 
of view of international law, this distinction is only of minor importance. 
Precisely from the point of view of national law, additional important 
aspects arise. These include, for instance, the relationship between inter-
national and national law, the division of powers and roles between the 
traditional prerogatives of the head of state or the executive branch at the 
international level, and at the national level the powers and competences 
of the legislatures. Can the executive branch oblige the state to apply an 
international treaty where the constitution requires the approval of par-
liament in such a situation?
Even after the expression of the state to be bound by the treaty (typi-
cally by ratification or by the deposition of the ratification instrument 
with the authorised depositary), it is not necessary to terminate provisi-
onal application according to international law, since it is conceived to 
operate until the entry into force of the international treaty. The pheno-
menon most resembling provisional application is that of the anticipated 
entry into force of an international treaty among the states that accepted 
it, which overcomes the national issues mentioned above.
With the exception of article 25 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (published as No 15/1988 Coll),66 which is incorporated 
65 The provisional application of the treaty concluded in 1840 between the United King-
dom, Austria and Prussia on the one side and the Ottoman Empire (then Ottoman Porte) on 
the other side is assumed to be the first example of provisional application. See A Geslin, La 
mise en application provisoire des traités (Editions A Pedone 2005) 6.
66 Art 25 states: ‘1. A treaty or a part of a treaty is applied provisionally pending its entry 
into force if: (a) the treaty itself so provides; or (b) the negotiating States have in some other 
manner so agreed. 2. Unless the treaty otherwise provides or the negotiating States have 
otherwise agreed, the provisional application of a treaty or a part of a treaty with respect to 
a State shall be terminated if that State notifies the other States between which the treaty 
is being applied provisionally of its intention not to become a party to the treaty’.
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in the Czech legal order but is not implemented in further detail, this 
institute is unknown to the Czech legal order. It is used in the aforemen-
tioned governmental Directive whose reach, however, is very limited. If 
the provisional application of an international treaty oversteps what may 
be the subject of a decision of the government or of a member thereof (eg 
organisational changes) within the limits of the laws in force, an explicit 
national regulation (legal basis) is lacking.
The comparative research based on the resources mentioned in Part 
III show that the approaches of individual states towards the provisional 
application of international treaties differ substantially. There are states 
that fully accept the provisional application of their treaties, while others 
couple them with certain constitutional limitations (usually limits on in-
terference into fundamental rights), and finally in some states provisional 
application is completely forbidden.
With respect to the generalisation of an overall approach to provisio-
nal application, we assume that the age of the constitutional or statutory 
regulations in question is more important than the position of individual 
state bodies within the process of national negotiation and approval: re-
cent legislation regularly contains more detailed provisions on the proce-
ss of decision-making related to provisional application in a given state. 
However, it is not possible to conclude on some objective criteria unless 
these are founded on the longstanding practices of Western European 
countries vis-à-vis the rather new democracies.
Certain links might be seen in historical and geographical deve-
lopment during the adoption of a new regulation, for example the model 
of the provisional application of international treaties in Germany, which, 
in principle, is followed in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hun-
gary. Similarities can also be found in the regulations of some states of 
the Western Balkans (the consent of the parliamentary committee for 
international relations in Slovenia and in Croatia).67
Another important issue in the provisional application of interna-
tional treaties concerns their official publication. On the basis of the 
available resources, such treaties are published in at least the following 
countries - Estonia, Finland, Spain, Romania (in the latter country all 
concluded international treaties must be published within 10 days of 
their signature), Germany and Slovakia. Some states (Norway, the United 
Kingdom) refer to the availability of the text of the provisionally applied 
treaties in other (unofficial) sources. Regarding the form of the publica-
tion, the notification of provisional application together with publication 
of the full text of the treaty and the announcement of its entry into force 
67 Council of Europe (n 6) 84.
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subsequently in the official collection is the prevailing method.68 But in 
Finland, for example, the text of the treaty is published twice in connec-
tion with both occasions mentioned above.
However, a direct link between national regulations on the parlia-
mentary approval of provisionally applied international treaties and their 
publication in the official collections does not seem to exist. The common 
feature of the states that have introduced a requirement to publish pro-
visionally applied international treaties is again more often found in mo-
dern regulations than in the similar approach to provisional application.
It follows from an international comparison that the Czech Repu-
blic should solve at least questions of the national regulation of the ter-
mination of provisional application, especially in relation to the role of 
parliament (see below). The process related to article 25 of the Vienna 
Convention is not regulated at all (the ‘intention not to become a party to 
the treaty’), while in other states this is the case.69 Next, already in the 
process of negotiating international treaties that might be applied provi-
sionally, the requirement to conform with the national legislation of the 
parties to the treaty should not be forgotten. Since a provisionally applied 
international treaty has the nature of valid law in relation to individuals, 
it should be published in the official collection (one can only follow a 
law one is aware of). Finally, the requirement concerning the immediate 
submission of a provisionally applied international treaty for parliamen-
tary approval should be introduced. This follows from the constitutional 
division of powers among the legislative and executive branches. It would 
be patently wrong for the executive branch to provisionally apply an in-
ternational treaty for a long time without allowing the legislature to give 
it its thumbs up or thumbs down. Such practice would clearly demon-
strate a circumvention of parliamentary approval of the ratification of a 
presidential (see above) international treaty. The refusal to grant approval 
for ratification by either of the two chambers of parliament should lead 
to the termination of provisional application. The same effect should be 
connected to the withdrawal of an international treaty from the procedu-
re of parliamentary approval by the government.
VI.2 Classification of international treaties
The classification of international treaties includes three sub-issues. 
The first is the division into presidential, governmental and ministerial 
treaties (see above), which overlaps with the second sub-issue – identifi-
68 As is the regulation in Estonia or Spain. 
69 The recently terminated provisional application of the international treaty concerning 
the processing and transfer of data on certain financial transactions for the purposes of 
the US Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme - TFTP. For details, see <http://euobserver.
com/22/30025> 1 accessed 24 October 2011. 
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cation of the treaties requiring parliamentary approval for their ratificati-
on. The third sub-issue consists of the identification of treaties according 
to article 10a of the Czech constitution, ie treaties transferring certain 
powers of Czech public authorities to some international entity.
The assessment concerning which treaties are governmental and mi-
nisterial follows from a negative definition: those that do not require the 
approval of parliament (see article 2 paragraph 2 of the Directive). The 
concrete assessment of whether a treaty goes beyond the competences 
of one ministry or not is conducted by the ministry under whose compe-
tence the subject matter of the treaty falls; the opinion of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs is here of great significance.
The president of the Czech Republic can also enter into this process 
by reserving for himself or herself ratification of a treaty in a specific in-
dividual case. The consequence of such a presidential reservation is not, 
however, the submission of the treaty to parliament. Informal consultati-
ons in the process of giving comments to the annual overview of internati-
onal treaties to be negotiated, or in relation to a directive for negotiations 
on a specific treaty, would rather lead to this effect.
Subsuming a specific international treaty under the categories listed 
in article 49 of the constitution requiring the consent of parliament for 
its ratification is not without difficulty. References to previous practice, 
where applicable in spite of changes in the constitutional text, provide a 
better orientation. In the event of controversies, the Government Legisla-
tive Council fulfils the role of arbiter.70
In any event, our focus here is not to clarify the individual categories 
of treaties, but to place attention on the fact that even this classification 
is carried out by the government (with the cooperation of the president of 
the Czech Republic, as the case may be).71 In our opinion, the government 
should not interpret the constitutional catalogue too narrowly, to avoid 
the danger of circumventing the controlling, legitimising and law-making 
70 P Mlsna ‘Ústavní aspekty zastupování ČR navenek prezidentem republiky’ [Constitu-
tional Aspects of the External Representation of the Czech Republic by the President of 
the Republic] in V Šimíček (ed), Postavení prezidenta republiky v ústavním systému České 
republiky [The Position of the President of the Republic in the Constitutional System of the 
Czech Republic] (Mezinárodní politologický ústav 2008) 214.
71 The dominance of the government is also illustrated in the dispute about the assessment 
of the so-called Irish guarantees attached to the Lisbon Treaty, either as agreements of a 
political nature or as explanations of the treaty provisions. The government – despite the 
president of the Czech Republic – followed the latter variant, ie declared the guarantees 
to be a governmental treaty. See Mlsna and Kněžínek (n 34) 227-228; J Syllová ‘Právní 
charakter irských záruk a ukončení ratifikace Lisabonské smlouvy prezidentem republiky’ 
[Legal Nature of the Irish Guarantees and the Completion of the Ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty by the President of the Republic] (2009) 3 Časopis pro právní vědu a praxi 203-210; 
L Pítrová ‘Irské a české záruky sjednané v Lisabonské smlouvě’ [Irish and Czech Guarantees 
Negotiated in the Lisbon Treaty] (2010) 1 AUC – Iuridica 91-92. 
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function of parliament. This is in line with the practice between the World 
Wars when, in case of doubt, the preference was for the international 
treaty to be submitted to the National Assembly (the equivalent then of 
parliament).72 The presidents of the foreign committees of both chambers 
are already informed of the intentions of the government in the process 
of negotiating presidential treaties, which could serve as a basis for po-
tentially more extensive consultations on the regime of a specific interna-
tional treaty. Nevertheless, the constitutional safeguard consists initially 
of the construction of article 10 of the Czech constitution, according to 
which only international treaties that were ratified with the approval of 
parliament may have priority over statutes. The government is therefore 
motivated not to bypass parliament, at least in the case of self-executing 
treaties.
In relation to the third sub-issue of this topic, we are not overly 
concerned with identifying treaties belonging to article 10a of the consti-
tution, which is considered to be an open topic, as was indicated by the 
dispute on the assessment of the nature of the Protocol on the revision of 
the number of deputies in the European Parliament. Rather,73 we focus 
on the role of parliament. In our opinion, the chambers of parliament 
are bound by the assessment carried out by the government. This is so 
since it is the only way to avoid a repetition of the conflicts arising befo-
re the adoption of the so-called Euro-amendment of the constitution in 
relation to the treaties on fundamental rights, ie possible divergence in 
the assessment of the treaty by each of the chambers. If we are to avoid 
discussions on whether approval of ratification was validly given at all, or 
disputes on the effects of such treaties, we must decide on the sole cen-
tre of assessment. The chambers of parliament can, of course, refuse the 
assessment of the government by expressing that they would not approve 
the ratification under these circumstances, or they would in fact reject it. 
On this basis, trilateral negotiations between the government and both 
chambers would take place. 
VI.3 Repeated submissions of a proposal on the expression of con-
sent with the ratification of an international treaty by the cham-
bers of parliament
It is useful to structure the issue of the repeated submission of a 
proposal to express consent for the ratification of an international treaty 
in two groups: a) the situation where none of the parliamentary chambers 
72 E Sobota, J Vorel, R Křovák, A Schenk, Československý president republiky. Státoprávní 
instituce a její život [The President of Czechoslovakia. The Institution in the Theory of State 
and its Life] (Orbis 1934) 346.
73 In principle, it deals with the issue whether all changes in the Lisbon Treaty are subject 
to qualified approval or only those that transfer the powers of the Czech public authorities.
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grants approval for the ratification of the international treaty; b) where 
one chamber gives approval for ratification, but the other does not.
The reasons why a chamber does not grant approval may differ: a 
repeated practice exists where the government withdraws a proposal in 
apprehension of a refusal, so that the hearing in the chamber does not 
continue.74 The chamber of parliament may refuse to grant its approval 
for ratification, or there will not be enough votes to express approval.75 
In the Chamber of Deputies, another circumstance can be added: in re-
lation to the end of its term, the hearings of all bills terminate and they 
must – in the case of concern or necessity – be resubmitted to the newly 
established Chamber of Deputies.76 Another way for refusing consent, 
stated by P Mlsna and J Kněžínek, is the revocation of the already given 
approval up to the moment of ratification.77
The latter situation has not happened yet, and we consider it at 
least questionable: in our opinion, an international treaty leaves open 
the sphere of the executive branch only for the process of expressing 
approval, as, once this approval is given, the chamber has nothing more 
to dispute, since the treaty is at the disposition of the government. The 
‘revocation of approval’ could also interfere with the review of the treaty 
by the Constitutional Court, because the filing of submissions by groups 
of deputies or senators is limited to the period between the expression of 
approval by the chambers of parliament and the ratification itself – the 
revocation of the approval would make problematic not the submissions, 
but rather the continuation of the judicial review, which would thus in all 
likelihood have to be terminated.
In the first of the examples mentioned above, doctrine and practi-
ce jointly state that, after rejection in both chambers of parliament, the 
government may resubmit the treaty for approval. A general rule can 
74 There were three cases in the 5th electoral term of the Chamber of Deputies (2006–
2010): the Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the 
processing and transfer of passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United 
States Department of Homeland Security was withdrawn from both chambers and then 
resubmitted. In contrast, two agreements with the USA concerning the establishment of a 
radar military base in the Czech Republic were withdrawn only from the Chamber of Depu-
ties (Chamber of Deputies Bills No 621 and 622), while they were approved in the Senate 
(Senate bills No 333 and 334) – available at <www.psp.cz> and <www.senat.cz> accessed 24 
October 2011.
75 This situation is very rare – eg the refusal to grant approval for ratification of the Con-
vention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions at the 9th 
session of the 6th functional term of the Senate on 30 October 2009 (Senate bill No 103).
76 After the end of the 5th electoral term of the Chamber of Deputies in 2010, a total of 19 
international treaties were left without the expression of approval by this chamber – see 
<http://www.psp.cz> accessed 24 October 2011.
77 The cited authors admit the possibility of the revocation of the granted approval with 
reference to older literature – Sobota, Vorel, Křovák, and Schenk (n 72) 351-352; Mlsna and 
Kněžínek (n 34) 233. 
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be inferred from this: the refusal of a proposal for ratification does not 
automatically lead to an absolute obstacle for a repeated future hearing 
of the same unchanged treaty (a change in the international situation, a 
different composition of the chambers, etc).
A more difficult situation occurs in the case where one of the cham-
bers gives its approval to ratification while the other does not, either 
because it did not vote or because the vote did not conclude with the 
granting of approval. We can then ask whether, in the case of persi-
stent interest in gaining approval for ratification, the government must 
resubmit the treaty again to both chambers or only to the one that has 
not given its approval. The practice has not been unified in recent years, 
mostly due to the insufficiently coordinated will of the government, but 
partly also because of the changes and differences in opinion of the par-
liamentary chambers; there have not been a significant number of such 
cases according to the information available.78 In the present electoral 
term, the government resubmitted all treaties that had not been voted on 
in the previous term of the Chamber of Deputies to both chambers, even 
if the Senate had already given its approval for ratification.
According to some, the decisions of the chambers do not cease to 
be valid in the next electoral term in general, although the question re-
mains whether the power of the government to submit first an interna-
tional treaty to either of the chambers also allows for its submission in 
a different electoral (functional) term. This could even relate to different 
governments. We can ask whether, in the case of a lapse of several years 
between readings of a proposal for the approval of ratification in each of 
the chambers, this would amount to bypassing the institute of parlia-
mentary approval: should we consider as a valid approval one given by 
the chambers with a ten years’ interval between them? Such an inter-
pretation would allow the government to speculate on the submission 
of a proposal to individual chambers. Moreover, if the government po-
stpones submission until the composition of one of the chambers chan-
ges favourably (typically the Senate, since a particular government does 
not outlast the electoral term of the Chamber of Deputies), the ratificati-
78 For example, agreement between the government of the Czech Republic and the United 
Nations for the Loan of Prison Staff to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia was submitted to the chambers of parliament in April 2006. The Chamber of 
Deputies did not hear the proposal before the elections (Chamber of Deputies Bill No 1286), 
while the Senate gave its approval of this treaty in October of the same year (Senate Bill No 
337). The proposal in question was resubmitted by the government only to the Chamber of 
Deputies (Chamber of Deputies Bill No 79). The Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material had nearly the same destiny (the Chamber of Deputies did not cast a vote 
before the elections, while the Senate had given its approval for ratification), but in 2007 the 
government resubmitted the treaty to both chambers (so that the Senate gave its approval 
twice). The authors wish to thank Dr D Bělinová, director of the legislative section of the 
Office of the Czech Senate, for these examples.
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on process could be quite prolonged. The settled constitutional practice 
wherein, since 2003, the Government submits proposals for the approval 
of ratification to both chambers simultaneously is also of importance, 
since it could indicate the existence of a constitutional custom.79
Reflections on the internal approval procedure lead to an understan-
ding of the whole process of ratification as being composed of individual 
phases, and the approval of both chambers is one of them – in particu-
lar after the phase of the submission of an international treaty by the 
government and before its ratification by the president of the Czech Re-
public. Repetition of the act of the ratification process should take place 
within these phases, ie when approval in one of the chambers is not re-
ached, it should lead to the resubmission of the treaty to both chambers 
(similarly, the refusal of ratification by parliament does not necessarily 
lead to renegotiation, ie to the opening of the text of the treaty. Therefore, 
it does not interfere with the first ‘governmental’ phase).
One could cautiously argue with the above opinion, mainly along 
the lines that the approval of parliament is not explicitly bound by time 
limits or terms, and secondly, it could seem fairly strange to require one 
of the chambers that has already expressed its approval to give it again 
for a second or third time only because the other chamber has objections 
against the treaty.
It seems to us that the only subject of easy codification is the sim-
ple requirement for the approval of both chambers based on the same 
submission. The reflection of the passing of time (the scope of the func-
tional and electoral terms and their overlapping) and the differentiati-
on between the lack of approval because no vote was taken, due to an 
insufficient number of favourable votes for approval for ratification, or 
because the government withdrew its proposal, would make any explicit 
regulation difficult, even unclear. However, we consider both ways to be 
in principle in conformity with the Czech constitution.
The tendency towards a more difficult way would be resolved by a 
decision of the president of the Czech Republic upon the ratification of 
a specific treaty, rather than by a general rule. From the point of view 
of constitutional law, the president’s act of ratification presumes confir-
mation of the proper internal ratification process. The president is not 
obliged to ratify an international treaty when he states the defects he has 
observed in the national process of expressing approval.
79 It is, however, disputable, because this practice was initiated by a decision of the go-
vernment that can obviously be changed. The parallel or subsequent (variably or in a fixed 
order – in the Czech Republic priority was held by the Chamber of Deputies until 2003, in 
Belgium it is the Senate) submission of a treaty does not resolve the problem of the repeti-
tiveness of the acts: does the disapproval of the second chamber in the process make the 
approval of the first chamber ‘invalid’?
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Therefore, should the president of the Czech Republic find deficits in 
the process of approving an international treaty (consent was given du-
ring different electoral terms, consent was given on the basis of proposals 
set at a different time by the government, etc), he would probably trigger 
negotiations in order to remedy unconstitutionality. If the government 
or one of the parliamentary chambers insists that approval be given in 
conformity with the constitution, the subsequent process could lead to 
a conflict of competence before the Constitutional Court, according to 
article 87 paragraph 1 lit k) of the Czech constitution. 
VI.4 Simplified parliamentary approval for the ratification of pre-
sidential treaties?
According to some, traditional constitutional requirements for the 
expression of parliamentary approval for international treaties in some 
cases no longer satisfies current levels of international cooperation.80 An 
example may be the regulation of certain issues in an international treaty 
that would otherwise, in purely national terms, require only regulation at 
the level of implementing legislation. Other examples could include cases 
that need a flexible reaction, and any waiting for the approval of parlia-
ment could endanger the fulfilment of the aim of the treaty. The question 
is how to balance the competing claims of rapidity and flexibility with the 
traditional roles of parliament.
In the first place, it is necessary to point out the possibilities arising 
directly from international law. Not every treaty requiring ratification, in 
the view of international law, requires the consent of parliament, even 
if this is often called ‘ratification’.81 This is also the reason why in some 
cases the terms ‘acceptance’ or ‘approval’ (see article 14 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties) are preferred.82 Another possibility is 
to conclude a formally non-binding memorandum of understanding that 
can serve as the basis for the unification of national practices which at 
the same time demand lower requirements in the case of modification 
or termination.83 In practice, the combinations of other mechanisms for 
the modification of existing treaties, connected, for example, with the 
requirement of a qualified majority and a certain number of expressions 
80 I Seidl-Hohenveldern, Mezinárodní právo veřejné [Public International Law] (3rd edn, ASPI 
2006) 53.
81 Thereby we can identify ratification required both by an international treaty and a con-
stitutional regulation, ratification insisted on by the treaty even if not required by national 
constitutional rules, ‘internal’ (small) ratification following art 49 of the constitution no matter 
if the parties to a treaty are not interested in it, and the below-mentioned subsequent ratifi-
cation of a treaty that was not originally subject to the reservation of parliamentary approval.
82 A Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (CUP 2000) 87.
83 In general, see ibid 26ff.
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of the contracting parties to be bound by the change, are used as well.84 
However, none of these methods can be applicable in the specific case of 
a multilateral treaty when one state is not able to persuade the others 
of the use of a certain form because of the possible complications in this 
state’s national ratification process.
Moreover, irrespective of its name, every agreement must be assessed 
according to its content, according to Czech law. This brings to the fore 
the issue of the interpretation of the reach of article 49 of the constitution, 
which lists the treaties subject to parliamentary involvement in the form of 
a decision (in principle a simple majority in both chambers, but in the case 
of the transfer of competences a three-fifths majority is required).
Another question could be whether, in the situation where the cham-
bers of parliament gave their approval for the ratification of an interna-
tional treaty, such an approval is necessary for every treaty modifying 
the original one. In our opinion, the competence of parliament is given 
precisely with regard to the list of treaties in article 49 of the constituti-
on, ie the content of the change is decisive. This material criterion can 
be completed by the formal criterion based on the principle of procedural 
equivalence according to which the modifications of an act are subject to 
the same procedure as the original act itself.
The issue of the modifications to treaty annexes of a technical or 
administrative character (lists of chemical substances or animals, etc) 
is to some extent specific. In particular, the Ministry of the Environment 
has under its competence a number of treaties containing, for example, 
annual quotas for permitted whale hunting, changing the lists of chemi-
cal substances, etc. It often happens that the Czech Republic does not 
manage to ratify the changes to an annex within a year, and another 
change is concluded in the meantime. Even if we overlook the fact that 
the delay is not caused in the parliamentary or presidential phase of the 
ratification process, but in the government, this separate issue could be 
solved on the basis of the concept of delegation. Together with approval 
of the ratification of a treaty that presumes the simplified change of its 
technical annexes (if their content does not fall within the catalogue in 
article 49 of the constitution and they are not self-executable), the par-
liamentary chambers would express their consent that such changes be 
approved by the government.85 Modification of the annexes must be sent 
84 The opt-out variants are also applicable when, for the modification of a treaty, it is suffi-
cient that a required number of states agree with the change and others must expressly 
notify that they do not want to be bound by such a modification. The changes adopted by 
majority voting are foreseen by some founding treaties of international organisations. On 
other methods, see, eg, Aust (n 82) 216ff.
85 In a slightly different situation, Ehrenzeller explains that the importance of the subject 
matter should correspond with the procedure – see Ehrenzeller (n 4) 83. Through consent 
with the delegation, we can read, for example, the specific procedures diminishing the 
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to both chambers for information so that supervision on the use of de-
legation is guaranteed. The way described above can be examined even 
without amendments to the rules of procedure of the chambers, either 
by direct testing or through more detailed directives implementing the 
parliamentary chambers’ rules of procedure.
A similar situation could exist with the president of the Czech Repu-
blic: once he or she is allowed to transfer the conclusion of treaties not 
requiring the approval of parliament to the government, he or she could 
in fact do the same in the case of the aforementioned technical annexes. 
In this instance, the president would have also ratified a treaty, aware of 
the simplified approval procedure provisions contained therein. Never-
theless, even if all participants of the ratification procedure reach con-
sensus, the decisive role connected with the application of the changes in 
the technical annexes belongs to the courts, should they be confronted 
with the question of whether the consent of parliament in the form of a 
delegation fulfils the requirements for the domestic application of the tre-
aty and its changes. In any case, we consider this route for the approval 
of international treaties to be in conformity with the constitution.
Besides this technique of simplified amendments, the fast-track pro-
cedure in the parliamentary chambers that are provided for in the rules 
of procedure should be given prime consideration.
VI.5 Ratification
The problem of the ratification of international treaties has been 
mentioned several times before. The main bone of contention related 
to the ratification procedure in the Czech Republic is the question of 
whether the president of the Czech Republic acts as an independent deci-
sion-maker with unfettered discretion, despite being limited by the condi-
tion of counter-signature.86 There is an alternative position, according to 
which the president is merely the formal bearer of competence, but it is 
need for a direct change of the treaty text in the Lisbon Treaty, ie the bridging clauses and 
the flexibility clause. This is roughly the view of the government presented in the opinion 
submitted before the Constitutional Court; the court had not, however, explicitly followed 
this view. Nevertheless, this particular example does not fit with Ehrenzeller’s comment 
quoted above; therefore, one cannot be surprised by the compensation of the consequences 
of these clauses by many parliaments. 
86 Probably the most complete conception can be found in the article by Z Koudelka ‘Pre-
zident a mezinárodní smlouvy’ [The President and International Treaties] in Conference 
Proceedings Days of Law 2009 (available at <www.law.muni.cz/edicni/dny _prava 2009/> 
accessed 24 October 2011). An earlier version of this article was published in Z Koudelka 
(2009) 9 Právník 929. The list of works by other authors maintaining the same position is 
summarised by R Malenovský, who himself maintains the opposite position – see R Ma-
lenovský ‘Může prezident republiky odmítnout (odložit) ratifikaci mezinárodní smlouvy?’ 
[May the President Refuse (Postpone) the Ratification of an International Treaty?] (2009) 22 
Právní rozhledy 812. 
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the government which determines the content of its use. This position is 
based on the context of the parliamentary form of government, in which 
the policy of a state, including its foreign policy, is operated by the go-
vernment which is responsible to parliament. Other reasons include the 
lack of the legal responsibility of the indirectly elected head of state and 
the inclusion of this competence among the competences requiring coun-
ter-signature. We do not dispute that it is the president’s hand that holds 
the pen that signs the acts within his or her competence. The disputed 
fact is whose will it is that moves the hand. The president, indirectly elec-
ted and exempt from legal responsibility, is subject to limitations in the 
parliamentary system. However, a directly elected president would not be 
subject to such limitations in a semi-presidential system, and this even 
if the catalogue of competences remained the same. Paradoxically, this 
could mean greater liberty in the exercise of the president’s competences 
in cases where the decision is subject to review (eg vetoing a bill) and, vice 
versa, greater self-restraint if the president’s decision is final.
The decisive factor in this debate is whether the president’s decision 
on the ratification of an international treaty is subject to the counter-si-
gnature of the prime minister or a competent member of the government. 
In the academic discussions which took place in Czechoslovakia between 
the World Wars, opinion crystallised according to which the necessity 
of counter-signature leads to the requirement for the harmonisation of 
wills of both co-signatory bodies. However, in the 20th century, the con-
struction was eventually recognised according to which the monarch in 
a parliamentary form of government, or generally the head of state in a 
parliamentary system, formally executes an act, but the content of the 
act or the fact whether the act is executed lies in the hands of the res-
ponsible government or the responsible minister. In short, the will of the 
politically responsible agent outweighs the will of the agent who is not po-
litically responsible, according to the maxim of the relationship between 
power and responsibility (ie, more power leads to more responsibility and 
vice versa), so that the head of state who is not politically responsible in 
principle cannot defy the proposal of the responsible minister.87
This is, of course, a rather simplified scheme from which there 
are many exceptions, usually derived from the current conditions (the 
power or prestige of the concrete head of state, political weakness of go-
87 J Krejčí Problém právního postavení hlavy státu v demokracii [The Problem of the Legal 
Status of the Head of State in a Democracy] (Moderní stát 1935) 56 and 68. Very significant 
are the words ‘in principle’, because they exclude unexceptional duty. The integrating and 
guaranteeing role of the head of state is thereby secured. The head of state thus acts as 
a corrective of governmental policy, rather than the government correcting the acts of the 
head of state. 
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vernments, fragmentation of parliaments, etc).88 If we scrutinise more ca-
refully the roles of heads of state, we find that one single type of conduct 
of head of state does not exist; in fact, we rather see several typical roles 
or ‘faces’.89
The above-mentioned framework implies an understanding of ratifi-
cation as the formal completion of national consultation and approval of 
an international treaty, rather than an act of unrestricted discretion by 
a head of state, whether he or she assumes the international obligation 
or not.
This reflects the interpretation of C Schmitt, even though his work 
is based on the Weimar constitution, but of course in the proper hi-
storical and international context.90 The Weimar constitution conferred 
the conclusion of international treaties on the President of the Empire, 
though the ratification of some international treaties was subject to the 
consent of the Parliament of the Empire. The regulation was similar to 
that of the 1871 constitution, in respect to which G Jellinek noted that 
the Emperor should assume only such obligations that he is able to fulfil, 
ie where he may count on the consent of the Parliament of the Empi-
re.91 Schmitt adds that refusal to ratify was considered something ab-
normal, almost an offence towards the other contracting state, until the 
reservations of parliamentary consent or consent by referendum occurs. 
Since that time, refusal to ratify an international treaty due to the refusal 
of parliamentary or popular consent is not considered exceptional at all.92 
The same implies that refusal to ratify an international treaty without 
the fulfilment of a specified condition remains abnormal, especially in 
the case of the head of state who concludes the treaty or authorises its 
conclusion.
The role of the president of the Czech Republic as a body ratifying 
international treaties has furthermore changed after the ‘Euro-amend-
ment’ of the Czech constitution, due to the new roles of parliament and 
the Constitutional Court. In the past, when subsequent legislative acti-
88 The basic and, in the era before the judicialisation of constitutional law, the only coercive 
instrument in relation to the head of state is the threat of demission. If the minister or the 
government does not intend to resign, the only effect of the refusal of the head of state to 
decide is the absence of a decision. If an alternative government exists to replace the for-
mer, the head of state may contribute to demission if there is an expectation that the new 
government would be more willing to co-sign the decisions that the head of state makes.
89 See, eg, J Wintr ‘Prezident republiky jako reprezentant státu, garant řádu a moderátor 
politických sporů’ [The President of the Republic as a Representative of a State, Guarantor 
of Order and Moderator of Political Disputes] in Šimíček (n 70), or V Bogdanor, The Monar-
chy and the Constitution (Clarendon Press 1997).
90 C Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (9th edn, Duncker & Humblot 2003) 269-271.
91 G Jellinek, Gesetz und Verordnung (Paul Siebeck 1887) 349, 354.
92 C Schmitt (n 90) 269.
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vity was necessary, consent for the ratification of an international treaty 
creating an international obligation of a state was given by parliament 
as a controlling body of the executive. After the entry into force of the 
‘Euro-amendment’ of the Czech constitution on 1 June 2002, the additi-
onal requirement for the transformation of international treaties into the 
Czech legal order has been no longer necessary. Parliament nowadays 
acts as a norm-creator when voting on an international treaty, since it 
decides on the treaty as a future part of the Czech legal order. We do not 
claim that ‘consent’ means ‘command’, but the character of the consent 
has of necessity changed.
The situation is even more evident when taking into account the 
preliminary review of the constitutionality of international treaties. In the 
absence of this procedure, it was the president of the Czech Republic 
who had to assess their constitutionality. If it is now the Constitutional 
Court that is called on to review constitutionality, and the extent of the 
president’s possible reservations is decreasing.93 
Even though we presume that the president has in principle a duty to 
ratify an international treaty,94 certain conceivable situations may appear 
in which the ratification would cease to fulfil its function (eg significantly 
worsened relations with the contracting state). Even in these situations, 
the president would not remain solitary, ie without the government’s opi-
nion. It is self-evident that most likely neither of the two presidents of 
the Czech Republic (V Havel and V Klaus) held the position that it is the 
president’s duty to ratify international treaties. Because parliament and 
the government remain reluctant to ‘force’ the president, either through 
official statements or through legal actions, to ratify international tre-
aties, it can thus be concluded that interpretation of this competence 
remains unclear.
VII. Observations regarding the ‘European’ Treaties 
Concerning the international obligations of the Czech Republic and 
other EU Member States arising out of international treaties (apart from 
international treaties to which the states are contracting parties), the si-
93 The president of the Czech Republic may not refuse to ratify an international treaty only 
for the reason of alleged unconstitutionality. See P Ondrejek ‘Role prezidenta republiky 
při sjednávání a ratifikaci mezinárodních smluv’ [The Role of the President of the Czech 
Republic in the Process of Negotiation and Ratification of International Treaties] (2009) 1 
Jurisprudence 53.
94 This opinion was also expressed by the notable Czech expert J Malenovský in ‘Kulečník 
namísto štafetového běhu’ [Billiards instead of the Relay Race] (2009) 4 Právní rozhledy, 
and this opinion was also held by the Czech Constitutional Court in the form of obiter 
dictum in the so-called second ruling on the Lisbon Treaty (Ref No Pl ÚS 29/09) available at 
<http://nalus.usoud.cz> accessed 24 October 2011.
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gnificance of international treaties concluded by the European Union (or 
the European Community before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty) 
cannot be ignored. These treaties are binding on the Member States and 
their importance rises in proportion to the increasing amount of compe-
tences which the Member States have conferred upon the Union.
The crucial issue for the enforcement of the Member States’ compli-
ance with international obligations concluded by the European Union is 
the setting of the effects, the consequences of these treaties in the Mem-
ber States’ legal orders (these effects include the direct or indirect effect of 
the provisions of international treaties in the legal orders of the Member 
States, and the primacy of their provisions over national law as well as 
secondary European law). While it is for a state to determine the con-
sequences of international law in its legal order according to the classical 
doctrine of public international law, in the case of the treaties concluded 
by the European Union, European law itself determines these effects.
The conclusion of international treaties by the European Econo-
mic Community itself was already anticipated in its founding treaty of 
1957 (in the framework of the common commercial policy).95 At present, 
the practice of negotiating international treaties goes much farther: the 
doctrine of implied powers of the Community or the Union has been 
upheld by the European Court of Justice.96 The conclusion often occurs 
of so-called mixed agreements, which are concluded both by the Euro-
pean Union and by the Member States. The main reason for negotiating 
mixed agreements is the fact that, in some areas regulated by the agree-
ment in question, the competences of Member States are transferred to 
the European Union.
The main difference between the mixed agreements on one hand and 
international treaties under the exclusive competence of the Union on the 
other does not lie in the process of negotiating the treaty, since it is the 
European Commission that plays the central role in both examples. The 
main difference resides in the process of the internal approval of such 
treaties. Mixed agreements go through the usual approval procedures in 
Member States as would any other international treaty concluded solely 
by them (namely, parliamentary approval), whereas treaties concluded 
under the exclusive competence of the European Union do not. 
95 Francis G Jacobs ‘Direct Effect and Interpretation of International Agreements in the Recent 
Case Law of the European Court of Justice’ in A Dashwood and M Marescau (eds), Law and 
Practice of EU External Relations: Salient Features in a Changing Landscape (CUP 2008) 14.
96 Paras 15 – 17 of the decision from Case No 22/70 Commission v Council (AETR/ERTA) 
[1971] ECR 263. For comments on this case, see P Eeckhout, External Relations of the Eu-
ropean Union (OUP 2004) 59ff.
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Internal consultation procedures in the case of mixed agreements 
often lead to these agreements including a clause on provisional appli-
cation, which allows application usually to take effect immediately af-
ter its signature.97 This conception, however, does not correspond to the 
traditional function of this institute – to apply an international treaty in 
exceptional cases before its entry into force, if compelling reasons exist 
for such application.
The Treaty of Lisbon brought the last (for the moment) setting of the 
division of competences between the Union and its Member States in the 
area of decision-making procedures. These have been demonstrated in 
several aspects in the field of international treaties:
1) the codification of the current case law of the Court of Justice of 
the EU regarding the competences of the European Union (previously 
European Community) to conclude international treaties;98
2) the increasing role of the European Parliament, which nowadays 
gives consent to the conclusion of more types of international treaties;99 
3) with regard to certain policies, where the Council decided by una-
nimous voting, the decision procedure has been changed to qualified ma-
jority voting.100
The process of negotiations on international treaties has changed in 
several other aspects (eg the role of the Union negotiator). But since this 
goes beyond the examined problems, it is not necessary to mention these 
issues in this paper. It can be concluded that international treaties with 
third states concluded by the European Union have been confirmed by 
the Lisbon Treaty as a general source of European law.
The rising importance of international treaties concluded by the Uni-
on logically requires that Member States should be more involved in the 
process of their negotiation. Even if treaties are concluded under the 
97 From the facts available on the Council internet pages (<http://www.consilium.euro-
pa.eu/App/ accords/default.aspx?lang=EN&cmsid=297> accessed 24 October 2011), it 
follows that in 2009 there were 14 international treaties provisionally applied out of 45 
concluded treaties (almost one third). If, as Geslin found in her research, out of approxi-
mately 33,000 international treaties registered at the UN after 1945, only about 1,000 (3%) 
have been provisionally applied (Geslin (n 65) 347), this shows that the conception of the 
provisional application of international treaties is somehow different in the European Uni-
on. 
98 This is not only the previously mentioned decision in the ERTA case, but many other 
judgements, including opinions delivered. 
99 The European Parliament obtained competence to co-decide on the conclusion of an 
international treaty inter alia in the fields where, according to the Lisbon Treaty, it may 
co-decide within the ordinary or the special legislative procedure – see art 218 para 6 lit a) 
point v) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter TFEU).
100 See art 218 para 8 TFEU.
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exclusive competence of the European Union, the Commission requires 
information from Member States in order to make use of them in the pro-
cess of negotiating similar treaties with other states.101 
VIII. Conclusion
The above-described pitfalls regarding the expression of the consent 
of a state to be bound by an international treaty shows that the incom-
plete constitutional regulation of the procedures for internal approval 
of an international treaty needs to be supplemented by more detailed 
regulation contained in the internal regulations of the government or the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as is the case in the Czech Republic, or di-
rectly in the law. No regulation can, however, substitute the consensus of 
particular state bodies regarding their role in the ratification procedure. 
Consensus in the Czech Republic does not exist, as was shown in the 
recent example of the ratification procedure of the Lisbon Treaty.
The prospective revision of internal regulations concerning the 
conclusion of international treaties in the Czech Republic should, in our 
view, rather regulate principal questions that could serve as a guideline 
to resolve various situations that international practice brings.
Attention should also be given to international treaties concluded 
by the European Union or the Union together with Member States, the 
significance of which will probably continue to increase. Negotiating such 
treaties is at present exclusively in the hands of the Commission. Wit-
hout institutionalised possibilities to control procedures by the bodies of 
the Member States, the Member States may end up being internationally 
bound by obligations about which they would find out only after their 
publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
101 Commission, ‘Evaluation of EU Readmission Agreements’ (Communication) COM 
(2011) 76 final <http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/intro/docs/COMM_PDF_
COM_2011_0076_F_EN_ COMMUNICATION.pdf> accessed 24 October 2011.
